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THE SUPREME COURT IN POLITICS
Terrance Sanda/ow*
BATILE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA. By Ethan Bronner. New York: W.W. Norton. 1989. Pp.
12, 399. $22.50.
Despite all that has been written about the bitter struggle initiated
by President Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork to a seat on the
Supreme· court, its most remarkable feature, that it was waged over a
judicial appointment, has drawn relatively little comment. Two hundred years after the Philadelphia Convention, Hamilton's "least dangerous" branch - least dangerous because it would have "no
influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the
strength or the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution
whatever" 1-had come to occupy so important a place in the nation's
political life that the question of its future course was capable of generating a controversy more intense and more divisive than all but a very
few contests for political office.
In the summer of 1987, when Judge Bork was nominated, the
United States was plagued by foreign trade and budget deficits that
arguably marked the beginning of a long-term economic decline.
Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Americans were homeless, the most visible symptom of the still unsolved problem of widespread poverty in the midst of plenty. Despite important progress in
civil rights during the previous twenty-five years, the besetting issue of
race persisted, amid signs that the conditions of life and future prospects of a large segment of the black population were deteriorating.
Both the educational and medical care systems were widely acknowledged to require significant repair.
The likely influence of the Supreme Court on these and other vital
issues facing the nation ranges between negligible and nonexistent. 2
Yet, President Reagan declared that securing Bork's confirmation
would be his highest domestic priority during the remainder of his
term (p. 214). The implicit judgment about the importance of the appointment might be discounted on the ground that Reagan was a
* Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1954, J.D. 1957,
University of Chicago. - Ed.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521, 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
2. Racial,,.issues are perhaps an exception, but because of increased black political power and
the character of the problems that must be confronted now and in the years ahead, the judiciary's
influence on the way those issues are addressed is likely to be far less in the future than it has
been for the past several decades.
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"lame duck," presiding over an administration weakened by scandal
and bereft of ideas for addressing the nation's problems. Still, others
thought the appointment even more important than he did. In a fullpage ad published in leading newspapers, Planned Parenthood declared that "[t]he Senate vote on Bork may be more important than
the next presidential election."3 The authors of the ad may have been
overwrought because they feared that Judge Bork's appointment
would threaten continued constitutional protection for the reproductive freedoms that Planned Parenthood exists to promote, but just a
few years earlier, in a calmer moment, Laurence Tribe had written
that "much more might ... be at stake in ... nominations [to the
Supreme Court] than in nearly anything else that might be done - or
undone - by the President who took ... office on January 20, 1985."4
The reason, Tribe went on to explain, is that "fundamental choices
about what sort of society we wish to become turn on who sits on the
Court." 5
Perhaps these extravagant _assessments of the significance of a
Supreme Court appointment should all be attributed to a myopia produced by the special circumstances and positions of their authors.
Similar judgments were, however, a commonplace of newspaper editorials, television talk shows, and myriad casual conversations among
the attentive public. Yet, few seemed to notice how remarkable it is
that the appointment of a Supreme Court justice should be thought to
have such importance. Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, once a distinctive feature of American government, is now a
relatively common practice in democratic nations. Yet, surely there is
no other country in which a judicial appointment would be thought to
have anything like the significance that so many people now attribute
to a Supreme Court appointment.
The reason so many Americans have come to regard the composition of the Court as so important is not shrouded in mystery. During
the past several decades, the Court has found in the Constitution answers to an extraordinary variety of questions of public policy. Issues
traditionally regarded as within the domain of Congress and state legislatures are now decided by courts, not only by the Supreme Court of
course, but nevertheless within a framework that it establishes. The
Court has thus emerged as one of the major policymaking institutions
of American government. Even those who believe, as I do, that the
importance of its decisions is often greatly exaggerated are bound to
recognize that it exerts considerable influence over wide areas of life.
3. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the Comm. of the Judiciary, United States Senate, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess.
4453 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings].
4. L. TRIBE, Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT ix (1985).
5. Id. at xviii.
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And since there is no greater consensus about the appropriate direction of constitutional law than there is about the directions in which
the nation should move in other arenas of public policy, the question
of who should sit on the Supreme Court takes on the same importance
as the question of who should occupy other significant policymaking
offices.
However remarkable it may be that judges should have such
power, once they do it is all but inevitable that their selection will at
times become a matter of intense public interest. As the domain of
constitutional law expands, and the bases of constitutional decisions
are seen to approximate those of other policy decisions, 6 citizens accustomed to participating in the election of their political leaders understandably will expect to participate in the selection of Supreme
Court justices. It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the
question whether Judge Bork should be confirmed led to a campaign
strongly resembling a campaign for high political office.
Since 1960, when Theodore White published his first Making of the
President, post-mortems of presidential campaigns have become a
journalistic staple. Fittingly, we now have two books that recount the
battle fought over the Bork nomination. 7 One of them, The People
Rising, by Michael Pertschuk and Wendy Schaetzel, 8 considers only
the campaign conducted by those who opposed the nomination. Both
authors are associated with the Advocacy Institute, which they describe as an organization "dedicated to capturing and disseminating
learning about citizen advocacy in order to strengthen the capacity of
all citizen groups effectively to pursue their own visions of truth and
justice,"9 a description whose accuracy depends upon excluding from
the class of "all citizens" those whose "visions of truth and justice" do
not coincide with the currents of contemporary liberalism. Among
Pertschuk and Schaetzel's stated objectives in writing the book are,
first, "to help those who would understand or be effective citizen advocates to learn the lessons drawn from the campaign," 10 and second, to
assess the importance of the campaign in securing Bork's defeat. 11
What they have written, instead, is a paean to the "adept," "prudent/'
"wise," "brilliant," "warm," "direct," "pragmatic," dedicated, selfless
men and women of uncommon vision who led the campaign, those
6. See Nagel, Political Law, Legislative Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question
Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 643 (1989).
7. Judge Bork has also undertaken to write about the controversy, but only in the context of
a book devoted mainly to questions of constitutional theory. R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA (1990).
8. M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE
BORK NOMINATION (1989).
9. Id. at xi.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id. at 9.
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whom they describe, without intended humor, as "a guerrilla band of
citizens lobbying for liberty." 12
Books about campaigns, Maureen Dowd recently wrote in reviewing a book about the Dukakis campaign, are of interest chiefly to those
who are mentioned, and even they "will be sufficiently satisfied by a
scrutiny of the index, and a look at the passages about themselves." 13
Read in this way, The People Rising should be a thoroughly enjoyable
experience, not only for individuals mentioned, but also for their
mothers. The only others to whom the book might be recommended
are those in whom the title produces a shiver of excitement.
I do not mean to suggest that readers who do not fit within these
categories will find nothing of interest in the book. One learns from it,
for example, that many of Nan Aron's female relatives "were very
feisty women" who "were involved in social movements" and that her
daughters, one named for Emma Willard and Emma Lazarus and the
other for an aunt active in the civil rights movement, "give every indication of following the same path." 14 So too, one discovers that Melanne Verveer spends so much time on the telephone that her coworkers presented her with a toy telephone at their organization's annual Christmas party. 15 On a more analytic level, Pertschuk and
Schaetzel's study reveals that hard work, willingness to put aside personal and organizational interest, and communication - even with
"difficult" people16 - are important in building a coalition. Perhaps
even more startlingly, it also reveals that there are people "beyond the
Beltway" who are well-informed and have useful ideas.
"The germ of this book," the authors write in a concluding bibliographic essay, "was a class project in a course at New York University
Law School on public interest non-litigative advocacy." 17 It is probably too late to wonder why a university would offer such a course, but
the hope may at least be expressed that, if the course is offered again,
The People Rising will not be a required text.
Ethan Bronner's 18 Battle for Justice, in sharp contrast with The
People Rising, is an engagingly told and solid journalistic account of
12. Id. at 7. This "guerrilla band," as their own book reveals, included many of Washington's most seasoned political operatives, the leadership of powerful national organizations, leading members of the bar, and many of the Senate's most influential members.
13. Dowd, Return of the Living Dead, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 11, 1989, at 44-45.
14. M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 47.
15. Id. at 56.
16. Le., people who are "prickly, garrulous, petty, negative (and draining), distrustful (if not
paranoid), righteous, self-important, [and] unlovable." Id. This conclusion does not seem to
have emerged from the authors' investigation of the campaign against Judge Bork since, on the
evidence of their book, there appear to have been no such people in the coalition that opposed
confirmation.
17. Id. at 306.
18. Bronner reports on the Supreme Court and legal affairs for the Boston Globe.
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the controversy. Although his sympathies can be discerned - they
are not with Bork - they are kept well under control. With admirable clarity, Bronner takes the reader through the President's decision
to nominate Bork, the campaign waged on both sides, the hearings
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Senate debate, and the aftermath: the ill-fated nomination of Judge Ginsburg and the appointment of Justice Kennedy. Background information about the major
participants, the Court, and the controversies surrounding its decisions is skillfully woven into the story. Lay members of the reading
public and the many lawyers whose work does not require close attention to the Court are the book's natural audience, but even Courtwatchers who followed the controversy - can there be any who
didn't? - may find it a stimulant to reflection on an episode that may
open a new chapter in the Court's history. 19
Despite the strengths of Bronner's account, disagreements and disappointments with it are bound to occur. My own center on what
might be called the "Republican side of the story." The book does
not, for example, shed much light on the question of why Bork was
nominated. To be sure, Bork's professional credentials and intellectual qualifications were outstanding, as impressive as those of any
nominee in a good many years and more impressive than most.
Although that circumstance was presumably not irrelevant to the
President's decision to nominate him, it would be na'ive to suppose it
was decisive - or even a very influential consideration. Of greater
importance, surely, was Reagan's commitment to appointing justices
who shared his Administration's constitutional philosophy. One suspects, moreover, that the President and his advisors were less interested in the abstractions of constitutional theory than in Bork's wellknown disagreement with various decisions of which they also disapproved - most notably, of course, Roe v. Wade 20 and its progeny.
Perhaps there is nothing more to be said about the decision. As
Bronner reports, however, Reagan knew that Bork would be an exceptionally controversial nominee, vehemently opposed by forces that
were bound to have an important influence upon the Senate's Democratic majority: "pro-choice" groups (p. 26) and the civil rights community that just two years earlier had blocked William Bradford
Reynolds' promotion to Associate Attorney General. 21 Indeed, the
public campaign against Bork began even before the nomination was
announced (pp. 37-38). Reagan's respect for the intense opposition
that Bork would engender had been demonstrated just a year before
19. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39, 75-92.
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Pp. 48-50. Several days before Bork's nomination, Ralph Neas, Executive Director of
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, had informed a high-ranking White House staff
member that the selection of Bork would "cause a fire storm." P. 36.
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when, in what Bronner characterizes as· "a complex political calculation" (p. 32), he passed over Bork and named Antonin Scalia to fill a
vacancy on the Court even though Republicans then controlled the
Senate.
Since in 1987, as in 1986, there were other possible nominees who,
though less controversial than Bork, held similar views, the inevitable
question is why Bork was nominated. Bronner's account is too thin to
shed light on the answer. He does report that as soon as Justice Powell's retirement became known, conservatives in the Justice Department and staff members of what he dubs "ultraconservative lobbies"
(p. 28) mounted a campaign on behalf of Bork, whom they appear to
have regarded as an important symbol in their efforts to reshape the
Court. Rightly concerned that the more moderate and more pragmatic Howard Baker, recently installed as White House Chief of Staff,
would favor a less controversial nominee, they looked to Attorney
General Edwin Meese to press for Bork's nomination. Meese did
make his views known to the President - we are not told what they
were - but Bronner was apparently unable to penetrate whatever deliberations took place among Reagan, Meese and other high-level advisors. In the end, therefore, the book provides no information about
the calculations that entered into the decision to nominate Bork rather
than someone who would just as surely help to change the Court's
direction, but who would engender less opposition (pp. 28-33).
My own speculation - obviously it is no more than that - is that
Reagan and his closest advisors did not mind the controversy and may
have welcomed it. Just because Bork had become a symbol, the nomination offered an embattled administration an opportunity to begin
drawing battle lines for the next election, which was little more than a
year away, and to activate important elements of Republican strength,
ideological conservatives and the "anti-abortion" movement.
Whether the nomination succeeded or was defeated, it would be a
sharp reminder of the importance of the power to appoint members of
the Court. I do not mean to suggest that the President anticipated
defeat, but the failure of the Reynolds nomination must have alerted
him to the possibility, and the risk must have seemed worth taking.
If these were the President's calculations, however - indeed, even
if they were not - the Administration behaved very oddly in the
months ahead. Between July 1, when the nomination was announced,
and the commencement of the Judiciary Committee hearings in midSeptember, opponents of confirmation were engaged in a massive campaign to arouse public sentiment against Bork and thereby exert pressure upon the twenty to thirty Senators whose votes were not fully
predictable. The Administration, however, proceeded as though this
were a routine, if somewhat controversial, nomination in which undecided Senators would cast their votes on the basis of the record, unin-
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fluenced by public opinion. The President did support the nomination
in a few speeches, though no major ones, but the Administration
seemed mainly intent upon damping controversy. 22 Bronner reports
that the White House, which was managing the campaign, discouraged conservative groups from becoming too publicly involved (p.
200), presumably to avoid fueling the charge that Bork was a "rightwing" ideologue. To counter that claim, it emphasized his credentials
and, astonishingly, attempted to cast him as a "moderate" in Justice
Powell's image.
The strategy, though disingenuous, may have made some sense at
the outset. The undecided Senators were themselves "moderates" who
might be won over by assurances that Bork was not a right-wing ideologue. Moreover, if the controversy could be contained within Washington, confirmation seemed likely, in part because presidential
nominations have an inertial force and, as Bronner suggests, perhaps
also because Bork, a Washington "insider," might be expected to win
an "inside" contest (p. 157). Within a month or six weeks of the nomination, however, it was apparent that the opposition had succeeded in
its effort to take the issue to the country. Whether Bork should be
confirmed was no longer just an "insider's" question. Yet, the White
House did not alter its strategy in response to the new reality, a failure
that Bronner does not adequately explain.
The failure, it seems to me, was largely an intellectual one, an inability to devise a strategy that would rouse public support for Bork as
intense as the opposition that had been aroused against him, 23 without
fueling the charge that he was a conservative zealot and thereby risking the loss of Senate moderates. Although plainly in tension, the two
objectives were not irreconcilable. The Administration need only have
pursued a course roughly opposite to that taken by the anti-Bork
forces. The leadership of the anti-Bork coalition had decided early on
"to avoid the A words - abortion and affirmative action" 24 and to
emphasize instead "privacy" and "civil rights." The tactic not only
enabled them to avoid issues on which they were politically vulnerable
22. The attempt is not necessarily inconsistent with the speculation that Reagan may have
welcomed the controversy. Responsibility for securing Bork's confirmation fell to Howard
Baker, who apparently did not play a major part in the nomination decision. Attorney General
Meese, who is likely to have had an important influence on the nomination decision, did not
actively participate in the struggle over confirmation, apparently because he was occupied by his
own difficulties. P. 35. It seems entirely plausible, therefore, that the nomination decision and
the effort to achieve confirmation might have been grounded in quite different premises.
23. Bork did have a considerable amount of public support - Senators actually received
more mail supporting confirmation than opposing it (p. 201)- but it lacked the intensity of the
opposition. Senator John Breaux of Louisiana captured the difference precisely when he told a
meeting of Southern Democrats that "[i]f you vote against Bork, those in favor of him will be
mad at you for a week. But if you vote for him, those who don't like him will be mad at you for
the rest of your lives." P. 287.
24. P. 160 (quoting Ricki Seidman of People for the American Way (PAW)); see also M.
PERTSCHUK & w. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 128.
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and to capture two powerful rhetorical symbols, but also to focus attention on Bork's criticisms of decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 25 Shelley v. Kraemer, 26 and Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 27 making it appear that his confirmation would somehow
serve to reopen controversies that had long since been settled.
The obvious course for the Administration was to circumvent the
opposition's strategy by using the issues the latter feared to build a
base of more passionate public support for the appointment. The
message the Administration needed to convey was not a very complicated one. It was simply that the live issue of "privacy" was not contraception, as the opponent's emphasis on Griswold suggested, but
abortion, and that the pressing "civil rights" issue was not the validity
of restrictive covenants, poll taxes, or literacy tests, but the use of racial "quotas." A campaign emphasizing abortion and racial quotas
might not have been welcomed by Senate moderates, but it need not
have alienated them. It might well have moved some, perhaps especially Southern Democrats, in Bork's direction, drawing attention
away from the concern that his appointment would reopen old
wounds and, probably more significantly, imposing a high price on a
vote against confirmation. Southern Democrats were under intense
pressure from black constituents, to whom many owed election. The
pressure might be overcome, if at all, only by arousing emotions
among Bork's supporters that were as intense as those that had been
aroused in his opponents.2s
The Administration's failure to mount a massive public campaign
emphasizing abortion and affirmative action was, in a number of ways,
fortunate. A campaign along those lines would surely have added to
the divisiveness of the controversy and it could easily have degenerated into ugliness of a kind that marred the campaign against Bork. 29
But the failure to conduct such a campaign may well have cost Bork
the appointment. 30
In the end, the Administration failed to develop any theme in sup25. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding state statute prohibiting use of contraceptives invalid under
the fourteenth amendment).
•
26. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding state court enforcement of racially restrictive home sale covenants to be violative of the fourteenth amendment).
27. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding poll tax to be violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 40-60.
29. See infra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
30. In an interview some time after the Senate vote, Howard Baker is reported to have said
that "I can't think of a single vote Bork would have gotten if we had had a mobilization of
conservative rhetoric on those issues,'' referring to civil rights and the expansion of individual
rights by the Warren and Burger Courts. Although acknowledging that the statement was selfserving, Bronner opines that "it seems right,'' a judgment he supports by invoking a poll conducted by the anti-Bork coalition which found that "Americans would be inclined by overwhelming margins to disapprove of a prospective Supreme Court candidate who had criticized
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port of the nomination, save for the bland ones that Bork was exceptionally well qualified and that he was not the extremist his opponents
sought to depict. The effects of that failure were palpable in the Judiciary Committee hearings. By the time the hearings began, of course,
the issue may already have been decided. Despite occasional protestations that the Senate's judgment would be made "on the record," the
rising tide of public opposition had very likely determined the votes of
most undeclared Senators. What the hearings offered, at most, was a
last-ditch opportunity to sway public opinion, mainly by intensifying
Bork's political support. Their effect, however, was to solidify the opposition. 31 Senators who opposed confirmation effectively employed
the hearings to hammer away at themes for which the public and the
media had been prepared by the campaign waged during the preceding
months. 32 Bork's supporters on the Committee lacked a similar platform. For that reason, among others, they were singularly ineffective.
Bronner's account of the hearings, although excellent in many respects, is flawecl by his failure to deal with the inadequacies of Bork's
supporters on the Committee. He covers their performance mainly in
a chapter, entitled "Missed Opportunities," that focuses on a number
of gaffes Bork committed while testifying and on Bork's failure to respond effectively to a number of "soft pitches" fed to him by Republicans. The impression it conveys is that Bork alone was responsible for
the failure to turn the hearings to his advantage. But though Bork did
commit some gaffes and did at times respond ineffectively - e.g., by
failing to give answers that would provide good "sound bites" on the
evening news33 - the hearings might well have played differently had
Committee Republicans provided more adequate support or, to put it
more bluntly, had they not been hopelessly outclassed by their Democratic counterparts.
A portent: of their performance at the hearings was provided
shortly after the nomination when Strom Thurmond, the ranking Republican, consented to Chairman Joseph Biden's decision to postpone
the hearings until mid-September (p. 229), thereby giving critics of the
nomination the time they required to mount a public campaign. Once
the hearings began, Thurmon~ and other Committee Republicans conrecent civil rights gains or revealed a reluctance to acknowledge a constitutional right to privacy." P. 348.
The question, however, is not whether Americans generally approved of recent gains by minorities or of a generalized right to privacy, which they had been led to believe was the only
reason contraceptives are legally available, but whether large numbers might have been mobilized by a more particularized appeal directed to abortion and affirmative action. My characterization of the Administration's failure as "intellectual" rests precisely on its failure to perceive
that distinction.
31. Surveys of public opinion revealed that opposition to confirmation rose during the hearings. See pp. 301, 308.
32. See infra notes 40-61 and accompanying text.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 86-89.
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tinued to be inattentive to the politics of the situation. Apparently
without objection from Republicans, surely without public cries of unfairness, Democrats were permitted to time the appearance of wit- .
nesses to maximize the television exposure of those opposed to the
nomination and to deny coverage to those who supported it. At one
point, Thurmond even acceded to a request by Senator Edward Kennedy to defer testimony by witnesses who favored nomination in order
to hear two opponents whose testimony was intended to cast doubt on
the veracity of Bork's account of the events leading to the appointment
of Leon Jaworski as Watergate Special Prosecutor,34 thus facilitating
coverage of the latter on the network news.
The Republicans' ineptness continued into the questioning of witnesses. In contrast with the Democrats, whose questions exhibited
both an awareness that the purpose of the hearings was to influence
public opinion and a strategy for doing so, the Republicans were, in
the main, defensive and unfocused. In part, their ineffectiveness was
attributable to the Administration's failure to develop a powerful affirmative theme in support of the nomination, but it was also of their
own making. Bronner reports, for example, that Senator Biden had
spent days with academic and other experts being coached on substan- ·
tive issues that would arise at the hearings (p. 210). There is no report
of similar preparation by any of the Republicans, and a review of their
questioning suggests that there was none. Often, their questions
merely served to provide opposition witnesses with additional opportunities to make the case against Bork. Follow-up questions that
might have put the latter's answers in an unfavorable light went
unasked. And while Democrats continued to drive home the point
that average citizens had an important stake in the outcome of the
controversy, Republicans too often raised points that were unlikely to
interest anyone. Senator Alan Simpson, for example, continually returned to the silly claim that holding Bork responsible for positions
taken in his academic writings would chill professorial expression.
The central chapters of the nomination story are not, however,
those that deal with what Bork's Republican supporters did or did not
do, but those involving the campaign waged against confirmation.
Shortly after his resignation from the Court of Appeals, Judge Bork
rightly said that the controversy over his nomination had led to "the
first all-out political campaign with respect to a judicial nominee in
the country's history" (p. 341). To be sure, controversy over Supreme
Court nominations is not all that unusual. Approximately one fifth of
all nominees have not been confirmed, 35 including five since 1968. No
34. Hearings, supra note 3, at 3192-93 (testimony of George Frampton and Henry Ruth); see
also id. at 3190-91.
35. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 78. For a complete list of nominees and the action taken on
them through 1985, see id. at 142-51.
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previous confirmation controversy, however, involved an appeal to the
public on the scale that occurred in the controversy over Judge Bork,
an appeal that very nearly converted the confirmation process into a
referendum on his appointment. But though the process leading to
Bork's rejection by the Senate was unprecedented, signs that the nation was heading toward greater public participation in the selection of
Supreme Court Justices have been appearing for years. Most obviously, five of the eleven nominees during the twenty years preceding
the Bork nomination aroused public controversy and efforts to bring
public opinion to bear on the Senate. 36 At least in retrospect, moreover, there were also other signs - the volume of mail now received
by members of the Court, 37 demonstrations aimed at informing the
Court of the demonstrators' views on pending cases, and increased media attention to the work of the Court, including in several instances
massive news blitzes in anticipation of important cases equivalent to
those that occur, on rare occasion, when issues of great national import are under consideration by the political branches.
Although unprecedented, therefore, the campaign waged against
confirmation may not be a historical anomaly, but the opening of a
new chapter in the Court's history. To suggest that possibility is not,
of course, to suggest that every nomination will be as controversial or
will lead to a similar campaign. Presidents will, at times and perhaps
often, wish to avoid controversy rather than to stimulate it. The Senate may be controlled by the president's party, significantly reducing
the prospects for a successful campaign against confirmation. But the
underlying source of the dispute over the Bork nomination - the controversial character of the Court's decisions and their importance in
shaping national policy - did not end with his defeat. 38 The lesson to
be drawn from the campaign against confirmation is that citizens can
be mobilized on the issue of Supreme Court appointments. That lesson is not likely to be forgotten as long as the Court continues to play
the role that it has during the past several decades. A look at the
campaign may, therefore, provide a preview of the future. It may also
raise questions about the wisdom of assigning that role to the Court. 39
Reports on the cost of the campaign differ widely, even wildly.
36. The five nominations are those of Abe Fortas, Clement Haynsworth, G. Harold Carswell,
and William Rehnquist (twice). Both that number and the total of eleven exclude the nomination of Homer Thornberry, on whose nomination no action was required because of Justice Fortas' failure to win confirmation as Chief Justice.
37. Justice Blackmun has said that he has received over 50,000 letters regarding abortion.
38. My point here is not that the Court's role is controversial, but that its decisions are. A
few law professors and perhaps some other odd people may worry about whether courts or legislatures should determine whether or under what circumstances women should have the freedom
to obtain abortions, whether racial preferences should be employed, or other issues of consequence, but the general public is largely oblivious or indifferent to that and other questions of
governmental structure. Their concern is with the substantive resolution of the issues.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 75-92.
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Bronner concludes that "all the anti-Bork groups together did not
spend more than a few million dollars. " 40 Several weeks before the
hearings, however, Time projected that the combined expenditure of
groups on both sides would exceed $20 million, an estimate supported
by a New York Times report that anti-Bork forces had raised $12 million and pro-Bork forces $6 million by the time the hearings began.41
Whatever the cost, it is clear that the anti-Bork coalition ran a campaign that employed many of the highly sophisticated techniques of
modem political campaigns. Focus groups and public opinion polls
were employed to ascertain the issues that could best be exploited.42
"Actualities," radio spots that sound like news, and "video news releases," an equivalent product for television, were "meticulously produced and aggressively promoted" (p. 146). Media consultants were
retained to manage relationships with reporters and editors, to monitor trends in media coverage, and to assist in devising a strategy for
gaining favorable coverage. Among the lessons taught by the consultants was that paid advertisements can be an effective technique for
achieving the latter goal. Advertisements, it seems, are understood by
editors and producers as a token of the seriousness of a campaign and,
if sufficiently catchy or controversial, may themselves become news,
thereby generating free publicity (p. 149).
The techniques employed by the campaign are, however, of less
interest than its substance, although there is no doubt some relationship between the two. "Actualities," "video news releases," and
catchy newspaper advertisements are not ideal vehicles for discussing
complex issues. Technology, however, is not responsible for the characteristics of the campaign that led political columnist David Broder
to describe it as a "lynch[ing]"43 and the Washington Post, which opposed the nomination, to condemn it for its "intellectual vulgarization
and personal savagery . . . profoundly distorting the record and the
nature of the man." 44 Among its more troubling aspects is what it
reveals about contemporary American liberalism. Liberalism in
American politics was once defined not only by a progressive social
agenda, but by a commitment to decency in political life. The cam40. P. 147. The figure apparently does not include expenditures for which there would be no
separate accounting, such as the salaries of the substantial number of people participating in the
campaign who were already on the payrolls of the many organizations that made up the
coalition.
41. Lamar, Defining the Real Robert Bork, TIME, Aug. 24, 1987, at 16; see also Berke, Fundraisers: Bork as a Bonanza, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1987, at A20, col. 6.
42. P. 158. The issue of "balance" on the Court was abandoned, for example, when a poll
revealed that only one third of Americans knew that the Court has nine members. Id. Similarly,
the poll made clear that abortion should not be emphasized because it was a divisive issue. P.
159. Conversely, the polls revealed that Bork's decision in the American Cyanamid case could be
crafted into an effective weapon. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
43. M. PERTSCHUK & w. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 208.
44. The Bork Nomination, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1987, at Al4, col.1.
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paign waged against Bork reveals how far we have come from that
time. The objectionable features of the campaign, it is worth emphasizing, were not the work of individuals and groups on the fringe, but
of political leaders and organizations that are at the center of contemporary American liberalism. Pertschuk and Schaetzel report, on the
basis of extensive interviews with participants in the campaign, that
the latter are "secure in the ethical standards to which they had held
themselves."45 If their report is accurate, they have revealed more
about the participants than they intended.
Senator Kennedy opened the campaign within hours of the President's announcement of the nomination. "Robert Bork's America,"
Kennedy declared in a televised statement from the Senate floor,
is a land in which women would be forced into back alley abortions,
blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break
down citizens' doors in midnight raids, school children could not be
taught about evolution, writers and artists could be censored at the whim
of government, and the doors of federal courts would be shut on the
fingers of millions of citizens for whom the judiciary is - and is often
the only - protection of the individual rights that are the heart of our
democracy. 46

Kennedy's contribution to public understanding of the issues raised by
the nomination was a harbinger of the campaign that followed.
A series of ads run by organizations that played a leading role in
the campaign is illustrative. The National Abortion Rights Action
League published an ad in leading newspapers that opened with the
following: "You wouldn't vote for a politician who threatened to wipe
out every advance women have made in the 20th Century. Yet your
Senators are poised to cast a vote that could do just that. " The ad went
on to suggest that Bork's views are even more retrograde than its
opening statement indicates, emphasizing in bold print that "[t]he
Supreme Court nominee doesn't think vital Constitutional guarantees
apply to women." 47
45. M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at ix.
46. P. 98. It would be tedious to detail all the distortions and misrepresentations in this brief
paragraph and in the other statements quoted hereafter. Those who read this review - not the
audience the statements were intended to influence -will have no difficulty making them out. It
may be worth pointing out, however, that Bork appears never to have addressed several of the
issues - e.g., the teaching of evolution and "midnight raids" - mentioned in Kennedy's statement and that he had long since abandoned positions - e.g., opposition to the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 - that might have provided a modicum of support for some of Kennedy's assertions.
See infra note 60.
In the course of a speech given at about the time of the Senate hearings, I said that I did not
know whether Kennedy's statement reflected ignorance or a deliberate effort to deceive the public, but that I could think of no other alternative. Bronner suggests one: indifference to the truth
or falsity of the assertions. "The statement," Kennedy said subsequently, "had to be stark and
direct so as to sound the alarm and hold people in their places until we could get material together." Bronner observes that Kennedy "never apologized for the statement. It had a function." P. 100.
47. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4452. And again, Bork's "expedient reading of the Constitu-
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Another ad, this one run by the National Education Association
(NEA), revealed that women were not the only citizens at risk if Bork
were confirmed. The ad stated the views of the NEA's president,
Mary Hatwood Futrell,48 who began, reasonably enough, by observing
that she was deeply troubled by Bork's embrace of the doctrine of
"original intent." She then went on to explain:
Had America held tight to the doctrine of original intent, I would
today not be a teacher. Nor would most of my colleagues. I would not
be a citizen. Nor would most of you. And many of us would be chattel
- items at public auction. America would be a land of a propertyless
majority ruled by an elite consisting of white, propertied, aftluent
males....
Fortunately, at critical junctures in our history, the Supreme Court
has rejected original intent and chosen instead to bring to life the implicit
ideals that constitute the heart of the Constitution.4 9

Planned Parenthood placed ads warning that Bork's appointment
threatened rights perhaps even more fundamental than those of citizenship: ''If your Senators vote to confirm the administration's latest
nominee," the ad declared, "you'll need more than a prescription to get
birth control. It might take a constitutional amendment." Warming to
the attack, the ad went on to label Bork an "extremist" who uses "obscure academic theory to arrive at positions that he himself admits
may appear 'bizarre' " and who "sees the Court not as a problemsolver, guided by past decisions, but as a reckless trouble-maker, aggressively seeking ways to upset past rulings he thinks are wrong. Regardless of the social havoc that may result. Or the pain and suffering
of innocent people."so
tion allows 'moral majority' extremists to hope they can force their dogma on the rest of us under
penalty of law•... as if the U.S. Constitution simply didn't apply to women." Id.
The claim that Bork thinks (or once thought) the Constitution or some of its provisions particularly the equal protection clause - does not apply to women was a continuing theme of
the campaign, eventually finding its way into the Judiciary Committee's Report. Id. at 6231.
For an analysis of the claim, see Born, Robert H. Bork's Civil Rights Record, id. at 1485, 1516-19,
and my prepared statement in support of the nomination, id. at 3292, 3296.
48. To understand the ad, it must be known that Ms. Futrell is an African-American.
49. Futrell, An Educator's Opinion: Justice Bork? We Can Do Better, Wash. Post, Sept. 27,
1987, at D4, col. 2 (advertisement). In fairness, it should be acknowledged that several
paragraphs later Ms. Futrell candidly stated that it did not follow from Bork's adherence to the
doctrine of original intent that he would "undo the progress toward justice for all that the Court
in its finest hours has wrought" or "return us to the judicial America of the 18th Century." Id at
col. 3. The decisive questions, she wrote, were whether he would "continue America's steady
march toward full rights for all Americans" and whether "America [can] afford to place on the
Supreme Court a man whose erudition carries the threat of judicial stagnation." Id.
With allowance for the rhetorical flourishes, those were indeed among the decisive - and
entirely legitimate - questions raised by the nomination. A campaign directed to them might
have made a significant contribution to the formation of an informed public opinion, but among
Bork's opponents Ms. Futrell alone was indiscreet enough to mention them publicly. Others
assiduously avoided such questions, presumably because raising them would risk focusing attention on the obvious next question: What precisely did Bork's opponents want an "un-stagnant"
Court to do to "assure full rights for all?" See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
50. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4453.

1314

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:1300

People for the American Way (PAW) extended the attack. In an
ad headlined "Robert Bork vs. The People," it informed readers that
"[r]ecent studies reveal that Judge Bork has already made up his mind
that large corporations are nearly always right." To support that
rather serious charge it pointed to a study that "found that he favored
corporations over consumers 96% of the time,"s 1 apparently a reference to a study by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Litigation Group, a
study somewhat marred by the minor methodological flaw of excluding ninety percent of the cases in which Bork had participated.s2
PAW also sponsored a television commercial that featured Gregory
Peck warning that "Robert Bork wants to be a Supreme Court Justice
but the record shows he has a strange idea of what justice is. He defended poll taxes and literacy tests which kept many Americans from
voting. "S3
The willingness of the coalition to play upon public ignorance and
fear in its effort to arouse sentiment against Bork is nicely illustrated
by its treatment of his decision in American Cyanamid, s4 a case in
which the sole issue was whether the act of a company in informing
fertile women that they might retain their jobs if they underwent sterilization was a "hazard" within the meaning of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. The women held jobs that exposed them to
irreducible lead levels harmful to fetuses, and since OSHA requires
protection of employees from that risk, the women were to be discharged or transferred. ss Bork wrote for a unanimous court, sustaining the determinations of both an administrative law judge and the
OSH Review Commission that the word "hazards," within the meaning of the Act, was limited to processes and materials and did not
encompass the option given to these employees. S 6
Pollsters had found that the decision was an ideal one for the coalition to exploit. "It showed," as Bronner writes, "that Bork opposed
women's rights, favored big business, and - get this! - approved of
sterilization" (p. 179). When informed of the decision, seventy-seven
51. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4454 (advertisement reprinted in statement by Comm. For a
Fair Confirmation Process).
52. Pp. 150-51; see also Anthony, Judge Robert Bork's Decisions in Which He Wrote No
Opinion: An Analysis of the Regulatory and Benefit Cases, in Hearings, supra note 3, at 1548
(discussing Bork's decisions and participation in business and regulatory cases).
53. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4455 (reprinting advertisement). Bork had criticized the
Supreme Court's decisions in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), which is not quite the same as defending literacy tests
and poll taxes.
54. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
55. Counsel for O.C.A.W. conceded at oral argument that the company might lawfully have
adopted a policy that only sterile women would be employed in the positions. 741 F.2d at 44950.
56. 741 F.2d at 449.
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percent of those polled said they were "much less inclined" to approve
of Bork (p. 178). The coalition knew what to do with that information. PAW informed the readers of its newspaper ad, in a paragraph
boldly headed "Sterilizing workers," that
a major chemical company was pumping so much lead into the work
place that female employees who became pregnant were risking having
babies with birth defects. Instead of cleaning up the air, the company
ordered all women workers to be sterilized or lose their jobs. When the
union took the company to court, Judge Bork voted in favor of the
company. 57

Planned Parenthood, similarly, wrote that "[i]n a case involving a
company which produced dangerous amounts of toxic lead, Bork refused to strike down a company policy which required female employees to become sterilized or to be fired from their jobs."58 And the
National Abortion Rights Action League wrote simply that
"[a]ccording to Bork women can be forced to choose between being
sterilized and losing their jobs."59
Each of the ads contained other misrepresentations and distortions, 60 but those that have been cited are adequate to convey the flavor of the campaign. 61 The extreme rhetoric reflected, in part, a
57. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4454.
58. Heanilgs, supra note 3, at 4453.
59. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4452.
60. Among the disturbing elements of the campaign, perhaps especially for those familiar
with the McCarthy era, was the dredging up of an article Bork had written in 1963 opposing
enactment of a bill that was to become the public accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Bork, Civil Rights - A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21. In the
intervening years, Bork had not only repudiated his earlier opposition to the legislation, but had
abandoned the libertarianism on which the opposition had been based. Pp. 67-70. Compare
Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 138 with Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Nevertheless,
Bork's opponents repeatedly sought to tar him with the article, a tactic sadly reminiscent of that
employed in the 1950s, when individuals who had long since abandoned their earlier Communist
sympathies were attacked for positions they had taken two decades earlier.
PAW went further, carefully choosing its words to convey the impression that Bork still
adhered to the views he had expressed in 1963 and, indeed, managing even to distort what he said
at that time. In the 1963 article, after acknowledging "the ugliness of racial discrimination,"
Bork had written that the premise underlying anti-discrimination legislation "is that if I find
your behavior ugly by my standards, moral or aesthetic, and if you prove stubborn about adopting my view of the situation, I am justified in having the state coerce you into more righteous
paths. That is itself a principle of unsurpassed ugliness." Bork, Civil Rights-A Challenge, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 22. PAW's ad purported to describe Bork's position on civil
rights in a paragraph headed (in bold face) "Tum back the clock on civil rights?" The paragraph
continued: " 'Unsurpassed ugliness.' That's how Professor Bork described a law that said hotels
and restaurants had to serve black Americans.... Ask yourself: Should America go back and
re-fight settled civil rights battles? If Robert Bork is on the Court, we may have to." Hearings,
supra note 3, at 4454.
61. The calumny of the ads was magnified in a number of ways. Literature produced by local
organizations repeated the misrepresentations and distortions and added some of their own. For
a sampling, see pp. 179-80; Hearings, supra note 3, at 4870-71, 4873, 5587. In addition, the
claims made against Bork were "news" and as such they received a good deal of attention from
the media. Bronner provides a trenchant, if brief, analysis of the reasons that "the charges were
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genuine sense of fear and outrage at the prospect of Bork's appointment. During the past several decades, many liberals have come to
think of the Court as their branch of government, in much the way
that farmers regard themselves as having a special claim on the Agriculture Department, business interests regard themselves as having a
special claim on the Commerce Department, and so on: 62 it is, or at
least ought to be, their voice in the corridors of power. Paradoxically,
the passion with which liberals lay claim to the Court owes much to
the belief that they are not an "interest group" like farmers or shopkeepers: they do not look to it merely for the protection of their interests, but for the expression of values and the vindication of rights.
Their belief that they have a claim upon the Court thus comes clothed
in a moral fervor that interests alone are unlikely to generate. Bork
had been openly critical of many of the decisions responsible for this
proprietary attitude, reason enough for outrage at the thought he
might now sit on the Court. 63 His nomination was an affront.
More was at stake than liberal sensibilities, however. Bork's appointment would threaten, if not doom, the prospects for extending
those decisions. The fear that the campaign sought to excite, that
Bork's appointment would lead to wholesale reversal of the many decisions he had criticized, was never very realistic. Not only were most
of the decisions too firmly woven into the fabric of constitutional law
but, probably more significantly, the political will to reopen most of
the issues was lacking. 64 The realistic fear, one on which the campaign did not dwell, was that, with the Court's current membership,
the combined weight of Bork's vote and the intellectual influence that
he might be expected to have upon the Court's deliberations would
end the hope that the Court might continue to act as an agent of progressive social change, a role that many liberals had come to regard as
among its most important. 65 A "moderate" in Justice Powell's image,
someone inclined toward open-ended balancing of all the considerations bearing upon the issues brought to the Court, might be expected
fully aired, but not their rebuttal." P. 150. And, of course, the charges were frequently repeated
in settings - e.g., radio and television programs - of which no record remains.
62. See T. LoWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
63. Interest groups understand, of course, that an unsympathetic Administration cannot be
expected to appoint individuals whd will forcefully advocate their interests, but the appointment
of people whose views are antithetical to what they regard as their interests violates the unwritten
rules of American politics. In this perspective, Bork's nomination might be seen as the
equivalent of nominating Ralph Nader to head the Commerce Department or an outspoken
opponent of affirmative action to be Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.
64. The obvious exceptions were, of course, affirmative action, on which the Court had not
yet charted a firm course, and abortion.
65. To say that the coalition that conducted the campaign did not dwell on that fear is nn
understatement. It took considerable care to guard against drawing attention to its fears, even to
the point of exacting from its members the ultimate sacrifice, an agreement that none would
testify at the hearings and thereby risk exposure of their constitutional views. See pp. 300-01; M.
PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 226-34.
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to cast a "politically correct" vote on at least some issues even if he or
she were of a conservative bent. Bork, however, was guided by a constitutional theory that eschewed just such a role for the Court. His
appointment thus threatened not just to slow the pace the Court had
maintained in the Warren and early Burger years, as the appointment
of a moderate would, but to bring it to a halt.
The rhetoric of the campaign was not, however, simply a cri de
coeur expressing the fear and outrage that so many liberals felt at the
prospect of Bork's appointment. Its tone and deceptions were more
calculated. Almost immediately after the nomination, Michael Pertschuk (of The People Rising) co-authored a paper entitled The Bork
Nomination: Seizing the Symbols of the Debate, which argued that
"Bork must come to be seen as an extreme ideological activist serving
as Reagan and Meese's political agent, dispatched to achieve what
they could not achieve in Congress, with the result of changing the
Constitution, uprooting four decades of settled constitutional precedents." The paper went on to suggest that the campaign should affix
to Bork such labels as ''judicial extremist," ''judicial reactionary,"
"enemy of the Bill of Rights," and "right-wing ideologue" (pp. 15657).

A poll sponsored by the coalition provided additional guidance.
Among the conclusions drawn from it was that the public would regard the nomination "as increasingly unattractive the more Bork
could be painted as someone with biases against groups or causes. It
would not be enough to show that Bork was extremely conservative;
he would have to harbor some kind of agenda" (p. 159). The pollsters
went on to caution against too much substance: "To engage public
opinion, Bork's opponents must keep their message clear, simple and
direct. Again and again, we find that forays into constitutional law or
judicial theory have the effect of impeding public understanding of the
fundamental objections to Bork's nomination" (p. 159). An effort to
avoid "impeding public understanding" by "forays into constitutional
law or judicial theory" is, presumably, what accounted for the "clear,
simple and direct" assertions in the coalition's ads.
The public, at which the campaign was aimed, did not, of course,
have a vote on whether or not Bork should be confirmed. The decision was made by the Senate, whose members, it may be assumed,
were less likely than the public to have been misled by the rhetoric,
simplicities, half-truths, and untruths of the campaign. Senators,
moreover, had the benefit of a record made by the Judiciary Committee at hearings that provided an opportunity to examine the nominee's
record and to explore issues in more depth than is possible in a media
campaign directed at the public. Extraordinary naivete would be required, however, to imagine that the campaign, through its impact on
public opinion, did not significantly influence the Senate vote or to
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suppose, as Pertschuk and Schaetzel argue, that its primary influence
was merely to free Senators from pro-confirmation pressures that
would otherwise have prevented them from exercising independent
and conscientious judgment. 66
The Senate, it seems too obvious to point out, is a political body.
Whether or not men are political animals, there is no doubt that Senators are. Politics suffuses the work of the Senate. It makes no sense to
ask how the Senate, apart from politics, would have voted "on the
merits," and then to ask, as a separate question, whether political considerations altered the outcome. Politics and "the merits" cannot be
severed in that way.
In any event, the testimony of witnesses and, more especially, the
"questioning" and comments of Committee members were often not
markedly different in tone and quality from the campaign that was
being waged on the outside. No doubt, the hearings also had another
side. Legitimate questions were raised - about Bork's personal commitments67 and intellectual characteristics, 68 the consistency of positions he had taken, 69 and his positions on a wide range of legal issues.
Often, the discussion of those issues occurred at a level appropriate to
their seriousness, without resort to populist rhetoric that would play
upon the ignorance and fears of the public. Senate hearings, however,
are not academic lectures or appellate court arguments. Especially
when public interest has been aroused, shaping public opinion ranks
high among their goals, with inevitable consequences for the tone and
quality of the proceedings. Issues must be presented in a manner that
is not only accessible to the public, but that will capture its attention.
Bronner deftly captures the point, when he writes, in assessing Bork's
testimony, that "Bork had not understood the nature of the proceeding. In fact, the nominee was getting it all wrong. He had prepared
for a bench trial, but with the entire nation watching, this was a jury
trial" (p. 226). Others did not make the same mistake.
The demagoguery of the campaign thus found its way into the
hearing room. Even when inflammatory rhetoric was avoided, the
66. M. PERTSCHUK & w. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 251.
67. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 2122, 2127 (testimony of John Hope Franklin):
There is no indication - in his writings, his teachings, or his rulings - that this nominee
has any deeply held commitment to the eradication of the problem of race or even of its
mitigation. One searches his record in vain to find a civil rights advance that he has supported from its inception.
68. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 2331, 2333 (testimony of Shirley Hufstedler):
In examining Judge Bork's record as an academician, as a high-ranking member of the
executive branch of the Federal Government, and as a judge, the evidence discloses his quest
for certitudes to resolve the ambiguities of the Constitution and of the Supreme Court's role
in constitutional adjudication, and an effort to develop constitutional litmus tests to avoid
his having to confront the grief and untidiness of the human condition.
69. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 713 (Sen. Arlen Specter questioning whether Bork's
"expansive" views on executive power were consistent with his rejection of an expansive and
evolving right to liberty).
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message repeatedly conveyed at the hearings was that in constitutional
law - indeed, in law generally - reasons are irrelevant. Only results
count. Judicial decisions are to be assessed - and courts are presumably to decide cases - as though judges have unlimited authority to
reach results consistent with the intuitive response of a public that has •
given no thought to the issues and is unaware of the full range of considerations bearing upon them. A few examples will illustrate the
point.
Senator Howard Metzenbaum inveighed at length against the decision in American Cyanamid, 70 asserting that because women should
not be forced to choose between sterilization and the jobs they want,
Bork's failure to protect them from that choice was "shocking,"
"frightening" and "inhumane." 71 Former Congresswoman Barbara
Jordan, with customary eloquence, explained to the Committee (and
to the television audience) that her own political career had depended
upon the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions. Recalling that
Bork had disapproved of the " 'one person-one vote' " formula as a
constitutional " 'strait-jacket' " for which there is no " 'theoretical basis,' " she commented, "Maybe not, gentlemen. Maybe there is no theoretical basis for one person, one vote, but I will tell you this much.
There is a common sense, natural, rational basis for all votes counting
equally." 72 The same theme pervaded Senator Kennedy's performance. As he stated in the peroration to his first round of "questions"
to Judge Bork, by way of dismissing the latter's constitutional arguments regarding the limits of judicial authority, "Lawyers can always
make technical points, but a justice ought to be fair." 73 Bronner cannily observes that
[w]ith network cameras focused on him, Kennedy was playing Oliver
North. He was appealing to the strong pragmatic, populist sentiment in
the country, the kind that distrusted lawyers who "make technical
points" and proceed to take away people's rights. His manner offended
many intellectuals of both left and right. But Kennedy was not after
their approval. He was aiming at a wider audience. [p. 226]

Bork's defeat produced euphoria among liberals across the nation.
Others might think, as John Patrick Diggins has recently written, that
"[a] victory won at the expense of the truth ... was not liberalism's
finest hour," 74 but they had saved their Court from its most prominent
critic. In doing so, however, they may also have changed the rules of
the appointment process in ways that will prove less to their liking.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
15.

See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 467-69.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 1004-05.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 158.
Diggins, The Judge Pleads His Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at
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Some pages ago, I suggested that the Bork controversy may have
opened a new chapter in the Court's history, one in which nominations are, not always but often, the subject of campaigns that bear a
strong resemblance to campaigns for political office. 75 The success of
· the campaign against confirmation demonstrates that citizens can be
mobilized on the issue of Supreme Court appointments, and it seems
quite plausible to suppose that presidents76 and their political opponents77 will each, at times, find it advantageous to do so. Increased
public participation in the selection of justices is, for that reason, an all
but inevitable consequence of the perceived importance of the Court's
decisions and the influence that the personal views of the justices have
upon those decisions. If that judgment is accurate, both the Court and
proponents of an activist judiciary would do well to consider the wisdom of assigning to the Court the role that the latter envision for it,
one in which, to recall Professor Tribe's words, "fundamental choices
about what sort of society we wish to become turn on who sits on the
Court."78
The lesson to be drawn from the Bork nomination, as I shall argue
briefly in closing, is that an enlarged role for the public in the selection
of the justices is likely to affect every stage of the ·process, from the
identification of candidates to the choice of nominees, on into the hearings, and inevitably in the Senate vote on confirmation. The Court is,
in brief, likely to become more deeply enmeshed in politics, threatening its ability (and that of inferior courts) to discharge responsibilities
that are both central and uncontroversial within the American
tradition.
In the course of a heated polemic published shortly before the
commencement of the hearings, Renata Adler charged that Bork,
"through his judicial opinions," had engaged in "a lobbying effort ...
for a position on the Court." 79 Pertschuk and Schaetzel point to
Bork's speeches while a judge in support of a similar charge. 80 Because I lack their gift of reading other's minds, I shall withhold comment on the truth of these allegations. The allegations do, however,
75. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
77. Among the motivations of some of those who opposed Bork's confirmation, as both Battle for Justice and The People Rising clearly reveal, was the belief that the controversy offered an
opportunity to invigorate a liberal coalition that in recent years had fared poorly at the national
level. See PP· 182, 186; M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 230-31, 275-91. To
recognize that motivation does not, of course, in any way impugn the sincerity of the stated
grounds for opposing confirmation.
78. Supra note 4.
79. Adler, Coup at the Court, The New Republic, Sept. 14 & 21, 1987, at 48. ("Usually these
missives were addressed to Attorney General Edwin Meese; in this single instance [an opinion
supporting two columnists in a libel action], Bork addressed instead a vital instrument of that
campaign, the press.") Id.
80. M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 17.
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suggest issues that deserve attention. Whether or not the belief is justified, the public utterances of prominent candidates for appointment to
the Court are likely to be perceived by some as campaign speeches, a
perception that significantly threatens public confidence in the judicial
process. Perhaps, as I have argued elsewhere, sitting judges should
avoid extra-judicial pronouncements bearing upon live legal issues, 81
but they can hardly avoid writing opinions, with the risk that those
opinions will thereafter be understood as planks in a campaign platform rather than good faith efforts to decide cases according to law.
The decisions of a sitting justice, similarly, may be understood as
merely carrying out a campaign promise rather than a conscientious
effort to carry out the responsibilities of the office.
More troubling than the potential erosion of public confidence in
the judiciary is the possibility that the suspicions underlying it may be
justified. Aspirants may campaign for a seat on the Court. Among
the lessons of the Bork nomination, which in no way depends upon an
assessment of his motivations, is that a high profile on controversial
issues can constitute an effective campaign platform, creating a constituency favoring appointment. 82 Individuals have, of course, often
campaigned for appointment, invoking sectional or partisan claims,
calling in political debts owed to them or to those with whom they
have connections, and so on. 83 The difference between a campaign
conducted on such grounds and one based upon a platform constructed out of stands on controversial legal issues is, however, of some
consequence. The latter, unlike the former, significantly threatens, if
indeed it is not flatly inconsistent with, disinterested performance of
the judicial office. A justice who has successfully waged a substantive
campaign for appointment has made commitments that cannot lightly
be set aside merely because he is now confronted with previously unanticipated arguments or because an issue looks different, as at times it
will, after appointment than it did before. 84
Equally troubling is the possibility that aspiration for higher office,
and the knowledge that they may one day be called to account publicly for their performance, may influence the decision of judges on
inferior courts. In some measure, of course, that risk is unavoidable.
Judges, some of whom are ambitious, will be called upon to decide
81. Sandalow, Book Review, 67 MICH. L. REV. 599 (1969) (reviewing A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968)).
82. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Of course, it may, as the controversy over
Bork demonstrates, also create opposition. That possibility, as every successful politician knows,
only suggests the need for care in crafting a platform.
83. See, e.g., H. AsHMORE, UNSEASONABLE TRUTHS 193-99 (1989).
84. For celebrated instances of such changes, see, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); and compare United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (Powell, J.) with Justice Powell's pre-appointment
position on the same issue. P. 23. See also What Nixon's Court Nominees Have Said About Key
Issues, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 8, 1971, at 40-41.
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controversial cases, and there is in the end no alternative to reliance
upon their courage and integrity. The appropriate question is not
whether those virtues will at times be required, but the frequency with
which they will and whether the prospect of some day having to defend decisions in a public contest over appointment to the Court will
exert a subtle influence on a judge's decisions. The campaign waged
against Bork, at the least, suggests grounds for concern. After that
campaign, for example, would an ambitious judge approach American
Cyanamid in the same way he would have prior to the campaign?
Might another such judge wonder whether it would be prudent to
compute the percentage of cases in which she had voted with corporations and against individuals? The point of these questions is not to
suggest that we can create a world free of such pressures, but that the
pressures are greatly multiplied when the public participates in selecting justices. Professional politicians, whether or not they are lawyers,
are likely to understand that legal issues are often complex and that
judicial authority is limited. The general public does not, and as a
result, the decisions of an inferior court judge are, as the campaign
against Bork demonstrates, fodder for demagogues.
Increased public participation in the selection of the justices may,
thus, significantly affect the behavior of candidates for nomination. It
may also come to exert an influence on the qualifications for appointment. It might have been helpful, for example, if Bork were more
telegenic. Indeed, prior to the hearings, several Senators informed the
White House that Bork should shave off his beard. His "record was
unsettling enough. He needed all the help he could get in looking allAmerican. "85 After the hearings, National Public Radio's influential
law correspondent, Nina Totenberg, commenting upon the influence
of television on the process, wrote: "If Robert Bork had looked like
Cary Grant, perhaps the public would have responded less harshly,
perhaps not. We will never know for sure. Television is a reality,
however, and like it or not, we will have to live with it .... "8 6
Television, which is merely a way of referring to the need to appeal
to a mass audience, may also demand other qualifications. Among
Bork's failings at the hearings, nicely captured in Bronner's observation that he had prepared for a bench trial, not a jury trial (p. 226),
was his inability to defend his positions in terms accessible to the public. The ability to communicate effectively with a mass audience, e.g.,
to capsulize a position on a complex issue in a way that will make a
85. P. 195. The White House rejected the idea, but only because "good packaging meant
invisible packaging. Shaving off a twenty-year-old beard just before public hearings would draw
more negative publicity than the beard itself." Id. Senator Heflin was sufficiently troubled about
public reaction to the beard "and the way he [Bork] wears his hair" that he raised the issue at the
hearings. P. 294.
86. Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1213, 1221 (1988).
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good "sound bite" on the evening news, has not heretofore been regarded as a qualification for appointment to the Supreme Court. Nor
is its relevance to the Court's work very obvious. But it would surely
have been useful to Bork, as it would be to any future nominee who
has aroused public controversy. I do not mean to suggest that Bork
would have been confirmed if he had been more skillful in this respect,
or even that he would have if he had had greater skill and also looked
"all-American." Perhaps he would have been, perhaps not. As Ms.
Totenberg writes, "We will never know for sure." The point, rather, is
that, to the extent that the public participates in the process of appointing members of the Court, the bases of selection will come to
approximate those for selecting elected officials.
The need to justify a position in terms that are persuasive to the
public is also likely to have substantive consequences. Some positions
just are harder than their opposites to justify to a nonprofessional audience, especially when they are the subject of demagogic attack.
They are not, for that reason, illegitimate, and they may even be preferable. Though some will regard it as impermissibly elitist to say so, it
is folly to expect the public to understand and evaluate positions that
depend upon knowledge it takes years to acquire and that are the
product of reflection on an intellectual tradition. Bork's reasons for
rejecting an "unstructured" right of privacy and his positions on antitrust, for example, may or may not make for good law, but it is foolish
to suppose that either can be evaluated by the public. The defense of
such positions in a televised hearing is simply not likely to be successful, and the nominee who wishes to gain confirmation might well conclude that it would be best not to make the effort. Better to take
positions that are likely to have greater public appeal or that will avoid
hostile questions by potential adversaries on the Committee. Positions
taken at the hearings are not, of course, binding subsequent to confirmation, but few successful nominees are likely to ignore them.
The increasingly probing character of the confirmation process significantly adds to the risk that members of the Court will be constrained by public positions taken prior to their appointment. Within
the space of several decades the tradition that Supreme Court nominees did not testify at their confirmation hearings has yielded initially
to an understanding that they would testify, but avoid comment on
specific legal issues and then, in the Bork hearings, to an expectation
that the nominee would discuss his judicial philosophy with sufficient
particularity to permit the Senate and the public to understand its implications. Bork was accordingly drawn into discussion of quite specific legal issues, leading him to state positions that, had he been
confirmed, would necessarily have embarrassed his performance as a·
member of the Court. To be sure, Bork's record made it unusually
difficult for him to avoid being drawn into such discussions, but now
that the precedent has been established, future nominees will not find
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it easy to escape with the banalities and platitudes that have heretofore
been regarded as satisfactory. There is no ready answer to the claim
that the public and its senatorial representatives can meaningfully participate in the appointment decision only if they have information
about the nominee on which to base a judgment.87 Opponents and
even those who are merely wary of a nominee will inevitably be led to
test the latter's general statements by seeking to elicit additional information about his views. 88 Just how far the traditional proprieties will
give way is still uncertain, but in an era dominated by mass communications, the public's "right to know" has become a nearly irresistible
force. As every Senator knows, moreover, eliciting information is not
the only purpose served by questions that are put to nominees. They
are also a way of constraining a nominee's subsequent decisions.
Many of the concerns thus far expressed about the consequences of
subjecting Supreme Court nominations to a test of popular approval
might be substantially mitigated if it were likely that public discussion
would be conducted at a level calculated to illumine the issues. The
campaign waged against Bork does not suggest that public debate of
that character can be expected. 89 The careful reader will have discerned that I do not admire that campaign nor much that occurred
before the Judiciary Committee; indeed, that I deplore the excesses
and distortions that characterized both. I deplore them, however, in
much the same way that I deplore hurricanes, tidal waves, and earthquakes. Some years ago, in commenting upon complaints by defenders of the Warren Court against what may euphemistically be
described as the "rhetorical excesses" of its critics, Professor Louis
Jaffe wrote of the inevitability of public response to the decisions of a
Court that " 'makes policy' " - ~'not just the 'informed' criticism of
law professors but the deep-felt, emotion-laden, unsophisticated reaction of the laity." 90 Jaffe was, I think, precisely right. These characteristics of public discussion seem to be an unavoidable feature of our
political life, at least on those occasions when politics cuts deeply into
issues about which feelings are intense. However distressing, they
have come to be an expected part of the rough-and-tumble of
democracy.
They are far more troublesome when they intrude upon the selection of judges. QI The central justification for an independent judiciary
87. Id.
88. Justice Kennedy's success in deflecting most questions that called for an expression of his
views on controversial legal issues may be cited as demonstrating that the Bork hearings were
atypical. However, Senate Democrats had reasons for avoiding a contest over Kennedy. It
would, therefore, be a mistake to read very much into their failure to subject him to more inten·
sive scrutiny.
89. Nor, it might be added, does our recent experience with campaigns for elective office.
90. See Jaffe, Impromptu Remarks, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1111, 1111 (1963).
91. Mark Tushnet's recent suggestion that "Judge Bork's supporters have objected to the
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is its ability to operate at a remove from the passions of politics - to
decide individual cases "on the merits" and, especially in constitutional cases, to take a longer view than is possible for those who are
under pressure from an aroused public or from politically powerful
groups. Yet, just because I regard these pressures as inevitable, my
purpose in directing attention to the deplorable quality of public discussion during the Bork controversy is not mainly to criticize the participants, much less to suggest that the partisans on either side were
primarily at fault. 92 It is, rather, to suggest that these characteristics
of public debate over Supreme Court nominations may well be unavoidable if the Court remains in the vanguard of social reform, imposing constitutional solutions for controversial political issues even when
those solutions lack a foundation in our constitutional traditions. The
remedy for the ill-tempered and overheated debates on Supreme Court
nominations that we have experienced over the past two decades is not
to call futilely for more responsible debate, but appropriate restraint in
the exercise of judicial power.
Academic discussion of the threat to judicial independence that an
activist judiciary may produce has tended to focus on such direct attacks as the Roosevelt "Court-packing" plan and the "jurisdictionstripping" bills that have been proposed in recent years. The greater
threat, in my judgment, is that suggested by the controversy over the
Bork nomination - which, it bears repeating, is merely an evolutionary step in a series of such controversies over the past twenty years.
As the public and its leaders increasingly come to see the justices as
political actors, whose function is not markedly different from that of
other political actors, both the processes and bases of selection are
likely to approximate, more and more closely, those for the selection
of other political actors. If that occurs, no one - on either side of the
debate over Judge Bork - will be very happy with the outcome.

sort of political behavior that they expected Judge Bork to approve if confirmed," Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional Law, 88 MICH. L. REv 49, 80 (1989), misconceives the premises underlying arguments for judicial restraint. The political process to which advocates of
judicial restraint would have judges defer is not plebiscitary democracy, but a process in which
public pressures are mediated by a complex set of institutions. See, e.g., Sandalow, Judicial
Protection of Minorities, 15 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1190-93 (1977). Moreover, one might regret
certain tendencies in the political process without supposing that judges are competent to remedy
them.
92. The President's reasons for nominating Bork were, as I have already suggested, unlikely
to have been qualitatively different from those that motivated Bork's opponents. In view of the
inertial force of presidential nominations, an appeal to the public, on terms that would generate
public interest, was necessary if Bork were to be defeated. Nothing in our political history suggests that, if the situation had been reversed, the right would have been any less prone than the
left was to employ the tactics that characterized the campaign. The disappointment, for some of
us, was that the left proved to be no more immune to such tactics than the right has been.

